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Creation of a regional credit  
guarantee mechanism in Asia 
Gyutaeg Oh and Jae-Ha Park 
1. Introduction 
The development of the bond market has become one of the most significant policy goals in 
Asia. It is widely considered an important step towards preventing another financial crisis. 
There is a region-wide realisation that heavy dependence on bank-intermediated financing, 
especially on foreign currency short-term financing, was one of the main causes of the Asian 
financial crisis. Asia’s dependence on bank-dominated financial systems supported rapid 
economic growth, but left the corporate sector over-reliant on short-term bank loans, which 
made the financial system - and entire economies - vulnerable to external shocks. The 
development of local currency bond markets has, therefore, become one of the important 
policy initiatives in Asia to prevent another financial crisis in the region. 
The importance of developing the region’s bond markets has also increased recently as the 
need to recycle the vast amounts of accumulated official foreign exchange reserves directly 
into the region has risen. Since the financial crisis, Asian countries have accumulated 
substantial foreign exchange reserves, partly as a result of huge current account surpluses 
reflecting high personal savings and subdued investment demand. This increase in foreign 
exchange reserves was, initially at least, an intentional policy in response to Asian countries’ 
realisation that a lack of foreign currency liquidity caused the crisis. Unfortunately, however, 
Asia could not benefit much from these reserves since most of them have been invested in 
developed markets such as the United States and Europe. Capital flows from developing 
economies where investment returns are higher than in mature economies. The reserves are 
recycled back into the region in the form of risky assets such as equities and foreign direct 
investment. There are thus huge missed opportunities for capital market development in 
Asia. Until the Asian bond markets are fully established, East Asian borrowers will have to 
turn to the international financial markets. In order to facilitate the recycling of regional 
savings and to prevent the recurrence of a financial crisis, both Asian policymakers and 
economists concur that sound and liquid bond markets must be developed. 
With this recognition Asian countries have stepped up their collaborative efforts to develop 
and strengthen the bond markets in the region through diverse forums such as ASEAN+3, 
APEC, EMEAP and ACD. Since late 2002, experts and policymakers in Asian countries have 
exchanged their views and ideas on various issues relating to the development of bond 
markets. One of the most important policy issues that have been intensively discussed by 
policymakers and markets experts is how to develop and strengthen the credit guarantee 
mechanism in the region. Development of a credit guarantee market is thought to be critical 
for the development of the regional bond market, as one of the most critical factors hindering 
the development of the regional bond markets is the credit quality gap between the low credit 
ratings of issuers and the minimum credit requirements of investors. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the recent progress of 
discussions on the development of the Asian bond markets. In particular, we discuss the 
efforts by ASEAN+3, APEC and EMEAP. Section 3 provides an overview and discusses the 
characteristics of the Asian bond markets. In addition, we explain why progress in the 
development of the bond markets in Asia has been limited. Section 4 explains the rationale 
and background for creating a new regional credit guarantee mechanism, focusing on the BIS Papers No 30  225
 
credit quality gap problem and the limits of the existing guarantee institutions in meeting the 
need for guarantees in Asia. Section 5 presents possible options for a new guarantee 
institution including attributes, business strategy and institutional forms. Section 6 concludes 
with a discussion of policy implications. 
2.  Progress of discussions on the development of Asian bond 
markets 
A.  ASEAN+3: Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) 
An informal meeting of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministry Deputies and Central Bank Deputies 
(AFDM+3) was held in Tokyo in November 2002 to discuss specific ways to develop the 
Asian bond markets under the ASEAN+3 framework. A month later, in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 
a comprehensive plan for the development of the regional bond market, the Asian Bond 
Market Initiative (ABMI), was endorsed. 
On 28 February 2003, an informal session on “Fostering Bond Markets in Asia” was held by 
AFDM+3 in Tokyo, Japan. Various proposals were presented by member countries to 
contribute to the development of the bond markets in the region. The delegates agreed to 
further study those proposals in depth to achieve tangible results as soon as possible. 
Reflecting the proposals and opinions of the delegates, six working groups of volunteers 
were established to conduct detailed studies on various aspects of bond market development 
(see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
The six working groups of the ABMI 
Working group  Chair country 
1.  Creating new securitised debt instruments  Thailand 
2.  Credit guarantee and investment 
mechanisms 
Korea and China 
3.  Foreign exchange transaction and 
settlement issues  Malaysia 
4.  Issuance of bonds denominated in local 
currencies by multilateral development banks 
(MDBs), government agencies and Asian 
multinational corporations  China 
5.  Local and regional rating agencies  Singapore and Japan 
6.  Technical assistance coordination  Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia 
 
The working groups analyse two areas: (i) facilitating market access through a wide variety of 
issuance and (ii) creating an environment conducive to developing bond markets. The issues 
related to market access include: (i) bond issuance by Asian governments to establish 
benchmarks, (ii) bond issuance by Asian governments’ financial institutions (governments) to 
finance domestic private enterprises, (iii) creation of asset-backed securities markets, 
including collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), (iv) bond issuance by multilateral financial 
institutions and government agencies, (v) bond issuance for funding foreign direct investment 
in Asian countries and (vi) issuance of bonds in a wider range of currencies and introduction 
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to active participation by both issuers and investors are: (i) provision of credit guarantees, 
(ii)  improvement of the credit rating system, (iii)  establishment of a mechanism for 
disseminating information, (iv) improvement of the settlement system and (v) strengthening 
of the legal and institutional infrastructure for bond market development. 
The Working Group on Credit Guarantee and Investment Mechanisms chaired by Korea and 
China focuses on ways to promote the use of credit guarantee mechanisms in Asia. Many 
government delegates and market experts agreed on the need to study this issue in a more 
comprehensive and systematic way to produce a practically workable proposal. Also, the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) decided to contribute to the creation of an appropriate 
regional credit guarantee mechanism to support the development of the domestic and 
regional bond market in ASEAN+3 countries. 
B.  APEC: securitisation and credit guarantee 
The development of the regional bond markets has long been seen by APEC economies as 
an important objective in the broader effort to promote greater openness, diversity and 
competitiveness in regional financial markets. This position was reaffirmed most recently in 
the APEC Finance Ministers’ Joint Ministerial Statement of September 2002 and the APEC 
Leaders’ Declaration of October 2002 in Los Cabos, Mexico. The objectives of this initiative 
are to identify impediments to the development of securitisation and credit guarantee 
markets within the APEC economies and to propose appropriate solutions to remove them. 
Securitisation coupled with credit enhancement offers significant benefits for developing 
markets to the extent that it helps reconcile credit and liquidity mismatches between issuers 
and investors and can also facilitate balance sheet restructuring. 
This APEC initiative on the development of securitisation and credit guarantee markets is 
highly action-oriented, and it is co-chaired by Hong Kong SAR, Korea and Thailand. This 
initiative involves (i) holding policy dialogues for the APEC economies to exchange views on 
the use of securitisation and credit guarantees at the national and regional levels and 
(ii) sharing experience among APEC economies in identifying impediments and developing 
detailed action plans. The first policy dialogue was held in April 2003 in Seoul. So far, nine 
APEC member economies have participated in the initiative, either by sponsoring experts or 
by seeking expert advice on how to remove impediments in their markets. They are 
Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand and the United 
States. Through collaboration among expert panels, domestic interdepartmental taskforces 
and private sector advisory groups, action plans at the economy level have been drafted to 
remove impediments to the development of securitisation and credit guarantee markets in 
individual APEC economies. 
C.  EMEAP: Asian Bond Fund (ABF) 
The ABF is the first fund of its kind in the region. The first phase of the initiative, ABF1, was 
launched in 2003 and is fully invested in US dollar-denominated bonds in the EMEAP 
economies. Since then, EMEAP has been working on the second phase of the project: 
broadening the ABF to cover bonds denominated in local currency, or ABF2. Both phases of 
the initiative are aimed at promoting the development of the bond market by improving the 
domestic and regional bond market infrastructures. 
1.  ABF 1: the critical first step 
The establishment of ABF1 was announced in June 2003. All 11  EMEAP central banks 
invested in ABF1 at its launch, which had a capitalisation of about US$ 1 billion. The fund is 
now fully invested in US dollar-denominated bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign 
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Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand). The developmental benefit of ABF1 is more than the 
first-round demand effect of US$ 1 billion invested by the central banks. Indeed, the seed 
money invested by EMEAP central banks serves to attract additional money from the private 
sector, thereby deepening and broadening the demand in the markets. The promotional 
effect of ABF1 would generate second-round investor and issuer interest in the Asian bond 
markets, broadening the investor base and increasing market liquidity over time. 
Furthermore, the ABF1 initiative is a milestone in regional central bank cooperation. As 
noted, ABF1 is the first of its kind in Asia, and its success is as symbolic as it is material. The 
successful launching of ABF1 not only sent a strong message to the financial markets that 
the regional authorities are committed to stepping up their cooperative efforts in promoting 
bond market development, it also paved the way for the development of ABF2. The 
remarkable one-year time frame from the initial discussions to the actual commitment of 
funds and the subsequent launching of ABF1 testifies to the rapport and sense of ownership 
among EMEAP members, which will prove valuable towards the development of ABF2. 
ABF2 will involve many more complex and technical issues than ABF1, and the precedent of 
ABF1 should be very helpful in efforts to garner political support and commitment in the 
challenges to the development of ABF2. 
2.  ABF2: the bold new second phase 
Building on the momentum of developing ABF1, EMEAP has proceeded to study the 
feasibility and design of ABF2. Owing to the complexity of the project and the likelihood of 
opening up the funds for private sector investment in the future, the EMEAP Group has 
appointed financial advisers from the private sector to advise on the design and structure as 
well as the construction of benchmark indices for ABF2. 
In April 2004, the EMEAP Group issued a press release setting out the basic design and 
latest thinking behind ABF2. It was proposed that ABF2 would consist of two components: a 
Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and a Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF) (Figure 1). While 
many issues regarding ABF2, such as fund size and detailed fund structure, have yet to be 
determined by EMEAP after having taken into account such factors as market conditions, the 
latest thinking on ABF2 is described below. 
The preliminary framework of ABF can be described as follows. PAIF is a single bond index 
fund investing in local currency-denominated bonds in EMEAP economies. It will act as a 
convenient and cost-effective investment fund and new asset class for regional and 
international investors who wish to have a well diversified exposure to bond markets in Asia. 
The FoBF is a two-tier structure with a parent fund investing in a number of country sub-
funds comprising local currency-denominated bonds issued in the respective EMEAP 
economies. While the parent fund is confined to EMEAP investment, the country sub-funds 
are intended to provide local investors with low-cost and index-driven investment vehicles 
and at the same time give regional and international investors the flexibility to invest in the 
Asian bond markets of their choice. 
The ABF2 funds are intended to be passively managed against a set of transparent and 
predetermined benchmark indices, covering local currency bonds issued by sovereign and 
quasi-sovereign issuers in EMEAP economies. ABF2 is being designed in such a way that it 
will facilitate investment by other public and private sector investors. In addition to attracting 
additional money into the bond market, as in the case of ABF1, ABF2 seeks to achieve a 
larger and longer-lasting positive impact on regional bond market development. Several 





















ABF2 is likely to have a long-lasting impact on market development in addition to its effect on 
demand from the seed money invested by EMEAP. In the process of the development of 
ABF2, individual EMEAP economies can leverage the interest and momentum generated 
from the collective investment in ABF2 to further develop their domestic bond markets as 
appropriate. For instance, the appropriate EMEAP members can work with the relevant 
authorities to improve market infrastructure by identifying and minimising the legal, regulatory 
and tax hurdles in their markets, thereby facilitating the creation of fixed income products in 
the region. The momentum and political impetus generated from the development of the fund 
could perhaps help harmonise regulatory procedures, eg cross-registration of bond funds, 
and the cross-issuance and trading of bonds, and help address the issue of fragmentation of 
regional bond markets. 
ABF2 will also improve bond market infrastructure by encouraging the development of 
transparent, replicable and credible bond market indices for use in the PAIF and the FoBF 
country sub-funds. There is currently a lack of low-cost, passively managed index bond funds 
in most EMEAP economies, and most of the existing funds available in the markets are 
actively managed. Furthermore, the performance yardsticks for these funds vary 
substantially. It is hoped that the ABF2 bond indices would be widely adopted by private 
sector fund managers as benchmark indices for their fixed income products. For instance, 
private sector participants could clone or customise (by means of adding in corporate issues, 
etc) these transparent benchmarks and facilitate the setup of low-cost index bond funds. BIS Papers No 30  229
 
Derivative products might also be created based on such indices, which should greatly 
increase market liquidity. 
At the same time, ABF2 would also seek to encourage the development of exchange-traded 
bond funds (ETFs) in the region. ETFs are new to Asia, but have become increasingly 
popular and are a fast-growing fund category in the United States and Canada. The 
development of ETFs will help promote product diversification for both institutional and retail 
investors, increase market liquidity, provide low transaction cost bond fund products and 
make the price setting process more transparent. Thus, the seed money invested by EMEAP 
would also give impetus to product innovation that might otherwise not occur. 
3.  Asian bond markets: overview and factors hindering their 
development 
A.  Overview of the Asian bond markets 
The financial structure of most of the Asian countries is dominated by banks. Usually, the 
size of outstanding bank loans is much larger than that of outstanding bonds. Prior to the 
Asian financial crisis, Asian countries pursued prudent fiscal policies with balanced budgets. 
As a result, the government bonds outstanding were very limited. In addition, corporate bond 
markets were not developed in most of the countries because of the limited supply of bonds 
and underdeveloped infrastructure. However, since the 1997-98 financial crisis, government 
bond issues have increased sharply to finance budget deficits resulting from expansionary 
fiscal policy, bank recapitalisation and rising social safety net expenditures. Corporate bond 
issuance has also increased in most of the countries. In some countries like Korea, corporate 
bond issues increased dramatically, mostly led by rapid growth in the asset-backed securities 
(ABS) market. 
Asian bond markets accounted for 24% of the world bond market in 2001 with US$ 6.8 trillion 
in capitalisation. In recent years, Asian countries have sought to improve their bond markets, 
yet much remains to be done. In fact, the Asian bond market is in its infancy when compared 
to the US bond market with US$ 15 trillion capitalisation. Table 2 shows that the ratios of the 
bond markets as percentages of GDP in most Asian countries are less than 70%, except for 
Japan. The Japanese bond market accounts for about 85% of the Asian bond market, 
illustrating the fact that the Asian bond market is still in its initial development stage. Table 2 
also shows a high percentage of government bond issuance in Japan, China and Singapore, 
of corporate bond issuance in Korea, Taiwan (China) and Malaysia, and of financial 
institutions’ bond issuance in Hong Kong. 
East Asian countries’ bond issuance from 1997 to 2001 is shown in Table 3. The issuance of 
bonds generally increased during these years, but except for Korea and China, the size of 
the bond issue is still very small. In addition, the proportions of Asian stock markets to GDP 
are relatively higher than those of the bond markets. For instance, the capitalisation of the 
Hong Kong stock market is three times the size of GDP, while its bond market is only 38.1% 
of GDP. Indonesia’s bond market remains at only 5.1% of GDP, and that of China is only 
18.0%. 
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Table 2 
Asia’s bond market capitalisation, 2001 




















Philippines   21.6    20.5    –    1.1  94.9    30.3 
Thailand   36.2    18.4    12.1    5.7  50.8    31.5 
Hong Kong 
SAR 
 43.6   14.6   24.0    5.0  33.5   26.6 
Singapore   52.2    29.0    17.5    5.7 55.5    61.0 
Malaysia   82.8    32.0    8.4    42.4  38.6    94.0 
Taiwan, China    124.3    54.5    15.1    54.6  43.8    44.0 
Korea   292.7    77.3    97.9    117.5  26.4    69.3 
China   403.0    201.3    191.3    10.4  50.0    34.8 
Japan   5,816.9    3,904.7    1,211.7   700.5  67.1    139.4 
Total   6,873.3    4,352.1    1,578.0   942.9  63.3    104.8 
United States    15,366.6    4,271.9   8,658.2    2,436.4  27.8   152.4 





Bond issuance of East Asian countries 
In billions of US dollars 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
China   10.27   14.39   19.53   25.34   20.83 
Hong Kong 
SAR 
 3.52   5.03   5.71   6.09   6.33 
Indonesia   0.78   0.57   1.01   0.98   0.75 
Korea   23.55   23.83   30.64   37.54   38.14 
Malaysia   4.04   3.60   4.15   6.39   7.25 
The 
Philippines 
 2.04   1.58   2.50   2.42   2.45 
Singapore   2.69   2.90   3.68   4.48   5.68 
Thailand   1.74   2.28   3.68   4.08   4.27 
East  Asia   48.62   54.17   70.90   87.31   85.69 
Source: Ismail Dalla, “Asset-backed securities market in selected East Asian countries”, World Bank, 2002. BIS Papers No 30  231
 
B.  Factors hindering development of an Asian bond market 
As mentioned above, capital movement within the East Asian region is limited. Even with 
substantial foreign exchange reserves, current account surpluses, a surge in exports and 
high personal savings, not enough of the surplus capital has been circulated within the 
region. Important insights into this situation can be gleaned by examining the supply of, and 
demand for, capital in East Asia. On the supply side, low-rated assets in the region and 
capital controls and regulations have restricted foreign investment in domestic assets. On the 
demand side, there is a lack of expertise among institutional investors and risk-averse 
behaviour among regional investors. 
A wide credit quality gap exists between the issuers and the minimum requirement of the 
investors as the credit ratings of many East Asian countries are below investment grade, 
which on the whole discourages international investors. In addition, there are only a limited 
number of large, reputable firms which can issue high-rated bonds. The low credit ratings of 
bonds issued by East Asian governments or corporations have been one of the major factors 
hindering the development of the bond market in the region. The low credit ratings are mainly 
due to widely perceived political and commercial risks in East Asian countries. The low credit 
ratings of major East Asian countries make it difficult for international investors to invest 
without constraints. The bulk of Japan’s overseas capital investment, for example, is in non-
Asian bonds because the low credit rating of major East Asian countries means that Japan 
has few options for portfolio investment in East Asia. 
East Asia’s capital controls and regulations have been relaxed gradually but they remain a 
major obstacle impeding capital movement within the region. Capital controls and regulations 
create distortions in international capital flows. They often take the form of restrictions on 
foreign financial institutions entering the domestic financial market or a cap on foreign equity 
ownership in domestic financial institutions. Such restrictions have long since been removed 
in advanced economies such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, but many East 
Asian countries still control capital flows in many ways. Some notable features of capital 
controls are: (i) more restrictions on capital outflows than on capital inflows and (ii) relatively 
stronger control on capital inflows for bond investment than on capital inflows for equity 
investment. 
On the demand side, institutional investors in East Asia are largely underdeveloped. Most of 
the pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies are small and incapable of 
expanding their cross-border portfolios. Institutional investors are in their early stage of 
development in most East Asian countries. Four factors can account for the weak institutional 
investor base. First, bank-dominated financial intermediation in most of East Asia hinders the 
development of institutional investors, with the extensive branch networks of banks tapping 
high domestic savings. Second, corporate governance of family-controlled companies and 
the emphasis on the expansion of capital through business profits or bank loans tend to 
discourage the growth of institutional investors. Third, the absence of a long-term capital 
market and lack of long-term investment products complicate portfolio management by 
institutional investors. Fourth, the development of the institutional investor base is impeded 
by government legislation or decrees, such as those restricting pension funds or imposing 
rigid investment criteria on insurance companies. 
Risk-averse behaviour by regional investors is another factor limiting capital movement within 
East Asia, and was reinforced by the financial crisis. Both public and private investors from 
Japan, China, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore who are able to invest abroad have been 
reluctant to take risks as they consider East Asian investment to be riskier since the financial 
crisis. Also, East Asia shows a tendency to export risky assets and import safe assets. This 
is because the increase in accumulated foreign exchange reserves is creating a situation that 
structurally forces East Asian countries to manage their assets safely. East Asia’s relatively 
weaker capability to evaluate and manage risks also discourages East Asian investors from 
taking risks. 232  BIS Papers No 30
 
4.  Rationale for creating a new regional credit guarantee mechanism 
A.  Credit guarantees and securitisation as a solution to the credit quality gap 
Securitisation coupled with credit guarantees has been suggested by many experts and 
economists as one means of narrowing the credit quality gap between the low credit ratings 
of issuers and the minimum credit requirements of investors. A credit guarantee mechanism 
is an agency or institution that guarantees bonds by holding a certain sum of money at all 
times to immediately pay investors in the event that an issuer defaults. Two types of 
guarantees provided by existing guarantee institutions are commercial and political risk 
guarantees. Commercial guarantees protect against defaults caused by a company’s 
bankruptcy. Political guarantees protect against defaults due to currency inconvertibility, 
expropriation, war and social disorder or breach of contract by the government. 
A credit guarantor is able to close the gap between the low credit ratings of issuers and the 
minimum requirement of investors by enhancing issuers’ credit. The guarantor is in a way 
“renting” its high credit rating to the issuer to match the minimum requirement of the 
investors. Hence, securitisation supported by credit guarantees enables borrowers to issue 
asset-backed securities at much higher credit ratings than they could on their own. 
Combined with credit guarantees, these securities could attain a credit quality acceptable to 
asset managers by qualifying for investment grade ratings from the international rating 
agencies. 
Most bond-issuing Asian firms have poor credit ratings. There are a limited number of large, 
reputable firms, but they have been migrating to the global bond markets. Some small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have good credit records but are not capable of raising 
capital from either the local or regional bond markets. Moreover, many corporations in 
developing countries are rated low because their sovereign ratings are low. These 
corporations also have low credit ratings due to the poor quality of institutions and 
information disclosure. The supply of top-grade Asian bonds is very limited, pointing to the 
need to devise a practical and viable mechanism to increase the supply of investment grade 
Asian bonds denominated in local currencies. 
B.  Example using credit guarantees and securitisation 
The figure below illustrates one example of how credit guarantees and securitisation can be 
used to facilitate the financing of developing countries’ SMEs by mitigating the credit quality 
gap problem. This example entails implementing a two-tier securitisation process; one in 
borrowing countries and the other in capital-abundant countries. A two-tier process is 
necessary because of differences in the financial and legal systems among the participating 
countries in the region. 
As a first step, government financial institutions or agencies in capital-importing countries 
would securitise loans or bonds issued by SMEs in local currencies. Then, in a capital-
abundant country, a special purpose company (SPC) could be established to securitise the 
underlying assets, which are composed of the senior tranches from the capital-importing 
countries. The junior tranches, on the other hand, are assumed by local institutions in the 
capital-importing countries, which select the firms eligible for securitisation. Some senior 
tranches may be sold to local investors, but the remainder would be transferred to an SPC in 
the capital-abundant countries. Additionally, senior tranches could be backed by credit 
guarantees either from local credit guarantee agencies or government institutions in the 
capital-abundant countries. In this process, the newly created credit guarantee institution 
would provide guarantees for senior tranches. 
It should be noted that cooperation among participating institutions is critical for the smooth 
functioning of this system. The coupon rates of both underlying assets and asset-backed 
securities, fees for underwriting and credit guarantee and the portion of senior tranches BIS Papers No 30  233
 
compared to respective junior tranches are notable examples of many areas in which 
cooperation among participating institutions would be critical. Furthermore, because this 
proposal allows for the adoption of securitisation with proper risk-sharing among financial 
institutions, investors and guarantee companies, moral hazard is expected to be minimal. 
Figure 2 
SME financing using credit guarantees and securitisation 
Country A 
SME loans 
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A slight modification of the first proposal is illustrated by Figure 3. This modified proposal is 
nearly the same as Figure 2, the only difference being that it calls for providing currency 
swaps to investors who are not willing to assume currency risk. A government agency (GA) 
or other proper institution in country A would provide the SPC with currency swaps and then 
hedge the currency risk using back-to-back swaps with swap dealers. This would be done 
through the currency swap market, if one exists in the developing country, or with the help of 
the developing country’s central bank if there is no swap market. 
C.  Limits of existing guarantee institutions in meeting the guarantee needs in 
Asia 
In the near future, the greatest demand for guarantees in Asia is expected to be for local 
currency-denominated asset-backed securities and infrastructure revenue bonds guarantees. 
Guarantees for non-traditional ABSs such as SMEs, CDOs and non-performing loans 
(NPLs), and for mid-market, near investment-grade or unrated issues are in especially high 
demand. To meet these demands, currency risk or transfer and convertibility risk, regulatory 
and institutional infrastructures and technical assistance need to be taken care of. In this 
section, the existing guarantee institutions are examined to determine if they meet the 
guarantee needs in Asia. 
1. Multilateral  financial  institutions 
There are eight multilateral institutions that offer guarantee services to private and/or public 
projects: the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the African Development Bank (AFDB). 
The guarantee operations of the existing multilateral institutions are limited. Most of the 
institutions’ capital has been used for other types of assets; offering guarantees is not their 
main line of business. For instance, the IBRD’s guarantee business accounts for only 1.4% 
(US$ 1.58 billion) of its roughly US$ 116 billion in development-related assets, and most of 
its resources are used for loans. Among all the existing multilateral institutions, MIGA is the 
only one that performs guarantee operations as its main line of business. MIGA, however, 
only covers political, not commercial, risks. Hence, it can be concluded that the existing 
multilateral institutions do not meet Asia’s demand for specialised guarantee services in an 
efficient and focused manner. 
2.  Private guarantee companies 
Like the multilateral agencies, the guarantee operations of private institutions are also limited 
in size and business scope. The US monoline insurance companies tend to overprice Asian 
risk: they do not split the savings in the issuer’s cost resulting from credit enhancement with 
the Asian issuer. According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, studies of six structured 
deals done by US monolines in Hong Kong in the period 1994-99 show that there were no 
clear cost advantages, and most of the savings resulting from credit enhancement of the 
issuer were taken by the monolines. According to the insurers, this is because the small and 
underdeveloped Asian bond markets prevent US monolines from enjoying economies of 
scale. The reason for this is that the credit rating agencies consider the Asian financial 
guarantee business to entail greater political and commercial risk than the US financial 
guarantee business. Also, the deal closures were delayed because all guarantee decisions 
were made at the US headquarters. The issuers, especially first-time issuers, who used the 
US monolines’ guarantee services did not use their services to save money but to enhance 
marketability and reach a wider pool of investors. Due to the lack of funding efficiency, Asian BIS Papers No 30  235
 
issuers tend to rely more on bank loans and senior/subordinate structure than guaranteed 
bonds. 
Additionally, the US monolines cannot satisfy the demand for guarantee services in Asia 
because they do not cover Asia’s needs for local currency-denominated guarantees and for 
near-investment bonds and non-traditional ABSs such as SMEs, CDOs and NPLs. 
Monolines have conservative underwriting guidelines and do not issue guarantees for these 
riskier assets because they need to maintain their AAA credit ratings. 
3.  Existing Asian guarantee institutions 
In Asia, there is a credit quality gap in intraregional intermediation in long-term credit, and the 
existing private and multilateral guarantors do not fill this gap. Many of the existing 
guarantors lack focus on Asian countries, whose long-term borrowing and lending needs 
remain unmet. The unmet needs of long-term lending became even greater due to failure to 
invest during the crisis years. Many infrastructure projects were shelved for lack of long-term 
financing, and thus infrastructure remains woefully inadequate. However, the potential 
demand for well structured, long-term bonds of acceptable risk is rapidly growing, as 
witnessed by the ever growing trade surpluses and international reserves of the region. 
Most Asian countries, except for Japan, Korea and China, do not have local credit guarantee 
institutions. Even the existing ones, however, cannot meet the demand for credit 
enhancement and guarantees in the Asian bond markets, mostly because they have no or 
only sub-investment ratings themselves. 
4.  The experience of ASIA Ltd 
A regional multilateral guarantee agency called Asian Securitization and Infrastructure 
Assurance Pte Ltd (ASIA Ltd) was established in 1995 in an attempt to overcome the Asian 
bond markets’ unmet demands for credit enhancement and guarantees. It was the first 
regional credit guarantee agency established in Asia (located in Singapore) with more than a 
commercial objective - to facilitate the development of fixed income markets in Asia. Its 
shareholders included CapMAC Asia Ltd, Apmac Investment Pte Ltd, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), Employees Provident Fund of Malaysia, American International Assurance Co 
Ltd, Kookmin Bank, Netherlands Development Finance Co and Deutsche Investitions- und 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH (DEG). ASIA Ltd had total paid-in capital of US$ 150 million at 
the time of establishment. Initially, ASIA Ltd also intended to set up local agencies in the 
second phase of its development to cater to local currency-denominated bonds, while the 
Singapore main office would handle non-local currency- (notably US dollar-) denominated 
bonds. However, the Asian financial crisis led to the downgrade of its claims-paying ability 
rating in 1998, and currently it is in a run-off mode. 
ASIA Ltd applied zero-loss underwriting standards to its operations with a concentration of 
business in the credit rating range of BBB+ to BBB–. Rating requirements for ASIA Ltd were 
such that a maximum of 25% of its guarantee portfolio in non-investment grade bonds would 
still allow it to keep its A rating. After the onset of the financial crisis and particularly the 
downgrades of Indonesian and Korean credit risks, the claims-paying ability of ASIA Ltd was 
downgraded by Standard & Poor’s from A to BB in January 1998. At this time, the agency 
had to stop writing new business. As of end-1999, the company’s US$ 934 million credit 
insurance portfolio consisted mostly of sovereign, asset-backed, infrastructure and financial 
institution debt obligations throughout Asia. In terms of geographical distribution, as of end-
1999, 24% of ASIA Ltd’s guarantees and assumed reinsurance were outstanding to South 
Korea, 11.4% to Malaysia, 10.3% to Indonesia, 9.1% to Hong Kong and 20.9% to OECD 
countries (except South Korea). As of the end-March 2000, ASIA Ltd still had outstanding 
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Following the downgrade of its claims-paying ability, ASIA Ltd sought to raise additional 
capital to restore its rating to A. The shareholders were, however, unable to agree on the 
terms of a recapitalisation plan due to dissent over broadening the geographical coverage of 
ASIA Ltd. In April 1999, ASIA Ltd contracted out its responsibility for day-to-day operations, 
including surveillance of its credit insurance portfolios, to an affiliate of MBIA, and it is now 
effectively under the management of MBIA Singapore Pte Ltd. Inclusive of the Reinsurance 
Treaty with ERC Frankona Ruckversicherungs Aktiengesellschaft of US$ 100 million, ASIA 
Ltd now has total claims-paying resources of approximately US$ 250 million. 
In retrospect, the company’s business model had many structural problems which made it 
vulnerable to the shocks. First of all, at the time when ASIA Ltd was building its book of 
business in 1996-97, its risk management practices appeared to be prudent based on the 
assumption that country risk among Asian countries was not highly correlated. However, the 
reality turned out to be completely different; ie the crisis swept through most of the East 
Asian countries at varying intensities. Second, the institution was prohibited from providing 
any direct guarantees to non-Asian economies and certain developed Asia-Pacific 
economies (Japan and Australia). The geographical restriction not only significantly reduced 
the potential business available to the company but also exacerbated the correlation risk and 
concentration problem among Asian countries. Third, in relation to the second problem, the 
business deal flow of the company was too small and limited since its business area was 
limited to developing countries. It could not follow the detailed local market situations of each 
developing country. Therefore, the company was forced to engage in overly risky business. 
There should have been some close links or mechanisms for collaboration with local financial 
institutions and guarantee agencies. Fourth, the initial capital size was too small to absorb 
the big risks inherent in the provision of guarantees to developing Asian countries. What 
made the situation worse was that additional callable capital was not injected from 
participating shareholders during stress periods, contrary to the original agreement. Fifth, the 
initial credit rating, single A, was too low to do business. 
With high demand for credit enhancement and guarantees in the Asian bond markets, a new 
and more fitting multilateral guarantee institution that can meet the Asian bond markets’ 
current needs should be built. In light of the experiences of ASIA Ltd, the required level of 
capital should be much higher, and the return on capital should be lowered. The 
development of a regional credit guarantee institution would involve a stronger commitment 
to capital injection from participating countries during stress periods. Thus, the credit 
guarantee institution should initially be a “public” but “commercially viable” entity. Moral 
hazard problems should be mitigated by instituting an appropriate ownership structure. 
Exposure to each economy should be limited through structuring and reinsurance. Cross-
border risks should also be limited through an emphasis on local currency business. 
5.  Considerations for the creation of a new guarantee institution 
A.  Attributes of a regional guarantee institution 
A new regional guarantee institution clearly needs to be established to satisfy the unmet 
demands for Asian guarantee services. The objectives of the institution would include: 
(i) development of regional capital markets for stable access to long-term funds to facilitate 
private sector and infrastructure development, (ii) promotion of transparent and cash flow-
based lending by facilitating securitisation and bonds issues, (iii) catalysing investment by 
providing comfort to investors through guarantees for new products and issuers, 
(iv)  providing cost savings to issuers in the region by sharing the reduction in spreads 
resulting from credit enhancement, (v) improving the liquidity of bonds through diversification 
of investment products and (vi) creating an environment in the capital markets conducive to 
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To ensure the success of the new regional guarantee institution, contributions and 
cooperation among the ASEAN+3 member countries, proper pricing and business scope, 
exemption from regulation, risk diversity and sound underwriting policies are critical. The 
institution should also have a sufficiently high credit rating to foster the development of Asian 
bond markets. Acceptance by bond investors and sufficient initial paid-in capital and callable 
capital are other factors to be considered for successful operation of the institution. 
B.  Possible structure of a regional guarantee institution 
1. Business  strategy 
The primary guiding principles of the business strategy of the new regional guarantee 
institution would be independence and prudence. The institution should not be influenced by 
the main issuers or investors, or the country where it is located. The institution should be an 
entity staffed by first-rate professionals who are able to analyse complex deal structures. 
Finally, the institution should be prudent in risk-taking in order to remain sound and to attain 
success. 
The institution would provide credit risk guarantees, political risk guarantees and advisory 
and structuring services. Under the credit risk guarantees, the institution would provide local 
and convertible currency (US dollar, euro and yen) guarantees, partial credit guarantees, 
political risk guarantees and guarantees of loans to bond issuers. The products would be 
offered in three different phases. During the first phase, the institution would provide credit 
enhancement or guarantees primarily for ABSs and infrastructure revenue bonds, and 
advisory and structuring services. During the second phase, the institution would add 
products for SME CDOs in close cooperation with local credit guarantee agencies. Finally, 
during the third phase, the institution would provide a full-fledged range of products including 
guarantees for municipal bonds. The institution would not provide guarantees to sovereign 
bonds without conditionality. Because of these strict conditions, the institution’s guarantee 
business for sovereign bonds might prove to be very limited. 
Underwriting would be done according to the reinsurance model based on cooperation with 
local guarantee institutions. Instead of taking on the zero-loss policy, the institution would 
take on the risks with sufficient provisions. Because the institution would enter business lines 
perceived as risky, such as local currency-denominated bond guarantees, the reinsurance 
model would mitigate the risks. The role of the local institutions would be strengthened if the 
institution adopted the reinsurance business model. In other words, the first loss is assumed 
by the local guarantee institutions to the extent that they are able to assume it. The institution 
itself might take the burden of the second loss, thus alleviating both the credit risk and the 
currency risk. 
The target market is ASEAN+3 countries. The institution would operate in all of these 
member countries within two years of its inception. However, there would be country, obligor, 
institutional and regional concentration limits based on the Fitch’s Emerging Market CDO 
Model. The country concentration limits would be based on the country’s ratings: higher-
rated countries have higher concentration limits as their macroeconomic risks are expected 
to be lower than the others. The industry concentration limits would vary depending on 
whether the industry is global or local. Each obligor should represent no greater than a 
certain portion of the total asset pool. 
To maximise the benefits of the institution to the Asian region, it is hoped that the new 
institution will be rated AAA (both local and foreign currency rating) by one or more 
international rating agencies such as Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s or Fitch 
Ratings. A AAA credit rating extends the scope of benefit even to countries like Japan that 
have credit ratings above AA. A AAA rating also increases the spread between rates with 
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obtaining a AAA rating will be attracting enough capital. Nonetheless, the institution should 
strive to get a AAA rating. 
Adequate pricing would ensure a stable and sufficient return on capital for the institution. 
Moreover, the spread may be split between the institution and the issuers so that there will 
be adequate demand for the guarantee business. 
The institution’s marketing strategy would be to produce continuous deal flows that meet its 
strict underwriting standards through cooperation with intermediaries such as investment 
banks and commercial banks, and other institutions including the rating agencies, 
reinsurance companies and governmental and other regulatory authorities. In addition, to 
build firm investor acceptance for securities guaranteed by the institution, local, regional and 
international cooperation between regional and local credit guarantee facilities would be 
essential and actively pursued. 
The main objective of the investment portfolio would be to serve as a source of internal 
liquidity for the institution. The preservation of its capital would be imperative, and the rate of 
return should be reasonable. The annualised total rate of return of the portfolio would be 
compared with inflation as measured by the consumer price index with respect to the 
appropriate currencies, with the expectation of earning a positive real rate of return. 
Investments would include primarily fixed income securities issued by governments of major 
industrial countries such as government bonds of the United States and European countries. 
This will diversify the portfolio risk of the institution. 
With the aim of exercising due financial prudence and maintaining a sound capital structure, 
the institution would adopt standard financial strategies and policies. At all times, the 
institution would maintain adequate liquid resources. The guarantee leverage shall be up to 
20 times its capital, surplus and reserves. This limit is considerably lower than those of 
monoline bond insurers (with a limit of about 100 times), or ASIA Ltd (with a limit of up to 
40 times), which shows that the sponsors/shareholders of the institution would operate in a 
conservative manner. 
2.  Type of institutional form 
The institution may be either public or private. There are five possible institutional options 
depending on the legal status, organisational form and shareholders. The first option is a 
multilateral institution, which would be established through a treaty prepared and signed by 
participating shareholder countries. The second option is a private corporation with sovereign 
shareholders including governments or government-related institutions. The third option is 
also a private corporation, but the shareholders could include private as well as public 
shareholders. One example of this model is ASIA Ltd. The fourth option is a purely private 
corporation whose shareholders are private investors. The final option is an association of 
existing local guarantee institutions and companies in the region such as the existing Asian 
Credit Supplementation Institution Confederation (ACSIC). 
A multilateral institution would have many advantages over a private corporation. First, it 
would be relatively easy to enlist sovereign shareholders through the ASEAN+3 grouping, 
even with a low expected return on capital in the initial period. The political and commercial 
risks in Asia are considered very high compared to advanced countries and even developing 
countries in other regions, and it would also be very difficult to maintain zero-loss 
underwriting guidance in Asia. It would, therefore, be very difficult to find interested private 
investors since the return on capital would naturally be lower than that of private companies. 
Second, the injection of callable capital could be done quickly and with stronger commitment 
from shareholders during periods of stress. Third, the tax-exempt status of a multilateral 
institution could be a factor in the new institution’s price competitiveness. In addition, the 
provision of guarantees would be more efficient and competitive if the new multilateral 
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However, it should also be noted that a multilateral institution would have shortcomings. The 
most serious is the long period of time required to establish this type of institution considering 
the long and complex process of coordinating and reconciling the wide-ranging economic, 
administrative and political interests of participating countries. A multilateral institution might 
also by its very nature be more bureaucratic than a private company. 
A private corporation with sovereign shareholders including governments or government-
related institutions might share many advantages with multilateral institutions since the 
shareholders would be public. However, it might have a shortcoming in that callable capital 
might not be injected during periods of stress. Using an existing local guarantee institution 
would be the least feasible option since most are undercapitalised, might lack the capability 
and expertise needed to guarantee bonds and have no structure, rating and value as a bond 
insurer to investors. 
As discussed, each option has its own advantages and problems. However, considering not 
only the nature and prospect of the new guarantee institution, but the economic and financial 
environments in the region, a multilateral institution is believed to be the best option. To 
ensure intergovernmental support for the new institution by, and regional financial 
cooperation among, the ASEAN+3 countries, a multilateral institution is obviously a better 
model than the others. 
A multilateral institution would also be easier to establish than a private company in light of 
the attractiveness of the new institution to prospective investors. The decision on whether to 
establish a private or multilateral agency would depend on the attractiveness of its return on 
capital to private investors. The return on capital measures how effectively the company uses 
capital in generating profit, and is calculated by subtracting total costs from total revenues. 
The credit rating agencies consider the Asian financial guarantee business as involving 
greater political and commercial risks than the US financial guarantee business. As a result, 
the capital charge for the financial guarantee business is two to three times higher, which 
reduces the operating leverage by half or two thirds (from 100 to around 33). The much lower 
rate of return on capital in the Asian financial guarantee business means that it does not 
attract private equity. In conclusion, the tremendous social benefits and demands in the 
Asian market suggest that the financial guarantee business should be multilateral rather than 
private. 
A multilateral institution would also be optimal considering that the mandate of the new 
institution would be partly developmental in that it would facilitate development of bond 
markets and grant small and medium-sized enterprises wider access to financial markets. 
Finally, and most importantly, from a practical perspective, the new regional guarantee 
institution should take the multilateral institution form since a long time might pass before the 
new institution can generate steady cash flows, and its return on investment might initially be 
lower than private investors would require. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper reviews recent efforts by Asian countries to develop the regional bond markets, 
focusing on the creation of a credit guarantee institution. Establishment of a regional credit 
guarantee institution is proposed as a viable solution to deal with the credit quality gap 
between the low credit ratings of issuers and the minimum credit requirements of investors. 
Combined with securitisation, credit guarantees are urged as an effective means to solve the 
problem, among the most serious difficulties in the development of the bond markets in Asia. 
The existing guarantee institutions, including multilateral institutions and private guarantee 
companies, are not in a position to satisfy the already high demand for guarantees in Asia, 
which is expected to grow over time. It is, therefore, believed that a new and more fitting 
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established. Towards that end, important lessons can be gleaned from the experience of 
ASIA Ltd. Foremost among these, the new institution should be much more heavily 
capitalised, and the expected return on capital should be lower. The development of a 
regional credit guarantee institution would also entail a stronger commitment to capital 
injection from participating countries during stress periods. Thus, the institution should 
initially be a public but commercially viable entity. Moral hazard should be mitigated by 
instituting an appropriate ownership structure, and its exposure to any particular country 
should be limited through structuring and reinsurance. Cross-border risks should be 
minimised through an emphasis on local currency business. Although we presented some 
preliminary ideas on the institutional structure and business operations of the new regional 
credit guarantee institution, we believe further, in-depth study is necessary. Among other 
issues, we should seriously consider how to prevent moral hazard and make the new 
institution commercially viable in the long term. For that purpose, close discussion and 
cooperation among Asian countries is indispensable. 
The new guarantee institution is expected to greatly contribute to the development of the 
Asian bond markets. Other necessary components of the infrastructure and systems should 
be introduced and developed to support bond market development, including but not limited 
to credit rating systems, clearing and settlement systems, a centralised depository system 
and liberalising exchange and capital controls. 
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